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Abstract 
 
Current media attention on policy about Indigenous people has largely focused 
on the plight of rural and remote Indigenous communities and has centred 
around two main areas: land and economic well-being. The second dimension 
defines the Indigenous person as an economically rational being seeking to 
maximise individual benefit and share costs across the community. Policy 
options based on individual wealth maximising behaviour and rational self 
interested actions may serve to explain economic growth in the dominant 
culture of developed countries but is less useful in other contexts. We argue 
that assumptions inherent in capitalist policies are unlikely to mesh with 
traditional Aboriginal settings.  
 
Capitalist enterprises establish labour contracts founded on notions of individual 
self interest that may conflict with cultural community responsibilities and 
expression of identity. Individual identity in community and connection to place 
may undermine the motivational assumptions of free market solutions. Where 
norms and social interactions are important policy options should explicitly 
consider ownership structures and property relations.  
 
Cooperatives as a form of organisation offer the potential for economic 
development initiatives to align with the sociological and citizenship features of 
Indigenous communities. We propose that business can be structured so that it 
meets collective needs, operates to develop a competitive advantage from its 
cultural base, and competes in a western socio-economic dominant market. 
Explicit consideration can and should be given to the culturally evolving 
landscape in remote Indigenous communities. Policy alternatives incorporating 
traditional conceptions of citizenship offer some prospect for discontinuing 
colonialist legacies.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Social, economic and cultural factors contribute to less equitable outcomes and 
concomitant social problems amongst Indigenous people in Australia. Indigenous 
people suffer across the spectrum of indicators collated in the COAG [Steering 
Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (SCRGSP)] report (2003). 
“They confirm that disadvantage is broadly-based, with major disparities between 
Indigenous and other Australians in most areas” (Banks 2003, p4). The SCRGSP 
report (2003) highlighted the interdependence of family and cultural identity with child 
development and wealth creation (Figure 1, pXXI). The report identified the multi-
causality of outcomes as a key problem for measuring policy effectiveness, yet the key 
economic policy outcomes maintain a traditional approach in a segregated manner, 
overlooking the implicit interconnectedness. Promoting economic independence 
implicitly involves health, education and economic facets. Fielding (2002) explored the 
nature of the causality between sectors such as health, education and economic 
indicators, finding that linkages flow in both directions through a range of sectors. 
 
Limited recognition of Indigenous interests has resulted in land resource transfers, 
largely in remote areas. The economic potential of such areas is constrained by 
geography. Granting control of land capital to traditional owners might lead to local 
economic activity if there were reinforcing conceptions of individual property rights. 
Indigenous sense of community and partnership with place may not be conducive to 
entrepreneurial activity based on natural resource exploitation, the traditional remote 
area economic development activity. 
 
The form of organisation inherent in economic development policies also merits 
discussion. Martin (1995) describes the policy challenge of developing Indigenous 
enterprises as realisation of commercial and social viability, the enabling of distinctive 
Aboriginal values to persist. These values encompass work practices, relations, 
hierarchy and authority.  
 
This paper will firstly examine the practicalities of popular themes in Indigenous 
development. Then, the potential foundations for Aboriginal economic development 
policy will be reviewed. The limitation of excluding culture from economic policy may 
limit the effectiveness of policy options. Dean’s (2003) taxonomy is used to examine 
citizenship and sociological dimensions. These dimensions highlight why assumptions 
inherent in capitalist policies are unlikely to mesh with traditional Aboriginal beliefs, 
possibly a binding constraint to economic development. Finally, a preliminary 
application of culturally sensitive economic development policy to the form of 
organisation is examined. 
 
 
The Australian context 
 
 
There has been much recent media attention on government policy in relation to 
Indigenous peoples. This policy debate has been has largely been focused on the 
plight of rural Indigenous communities and has centred around two main areas: land 
and economic well-being. The fundamental assumption behind Australian Indigenous 
policy-making, that land reforms will create beneficial social outcomes, has not 
changed in these recent debates. The new dimension is seeking to define the 
Indigenous person as an economically rational being who seeks to maximise individual 
benefit and share costs across the community. The argument is that because 
Indigenous lands are collectively held that individual entrepreneurship has been stifled 
with the resultant health and social problems compounded by poverty (Hughes and 
Warin 2005).  
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The idea that there has been a general failure in policy to serve the needs of 
Indigenous peoples has resulted in a sustained attack on policies related to land tenure 
and Indigenous peoples. In this regard the Native Title Act 1993 and the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 have been criticised for failing to deliver 
economic opportunity. The argument is that these land laws do not deliver free hold 
title to individual Indigenous peoples and therefore entrepreneurship among 
communities is not encouraged. For example Hughes and Warin (2005) suggest that it 
is this stifling of entrepreneurship that leads to a failure of Indigenous communities to 
engage in the mainstream economy. Mundine (2005) also complains about the 
squandered opportunity of Indigenous land ownership. John Daly, chairman of the 
Northern Land Council, advocates greater utilization of land rights lands in order to 
break welfare dependency but suggests that the development of markets rather than 
the modification of tenure arrangements is the way forward (Ashleigh 2005). 
Arguments about the privatisation of land rights land have mostly focused on 
residential housing / home ownership on Indigenous lands rather than extensive 
property rights reform.  
 
Indigenous lands cover a substantial amount of continental Australia. There are 
significant differences between land rights and native title lands and between different 
land rights regimes. Native title is not a form of title, rather once determined it is a set of 
co-existing rights. For the most part native title has the potential to exist over 
conservation lands, unallocated government lands and pastoral tenures and therefore 
native title potentially covers about 75% of Australia. Any economic development 
benefits for Indigenous peoples on these lands will most likely be in cooperation with 
the underlying tenure holder or as a result of mining negotiations.  
 
The variable nature of land rights regimes is also a limiting factor. A substantial amount 
of the Northern Territory land rights land is former pastoral lease (much of this land is 
marginal country for pastoralism) while almost all of the Queensland Aboriginal Land 
Act land is either national park (approx 50%) or land that had already been set aside 
for Indigenous purposes (DNRM 2005). Consequently there are productive constraints. 
Debate about the use of Indigenous lands will need to take into account their location, 
the physical condition of the land and climatic factors, as well as the tenure of the land.  
 
 
Economic foundations of policy 
 
 
We explore the basis of development policy to examine the applicability of key 
assumptions such as the dominance of individualistic motivations. The human rights 
approach to development is canvassed along with macroeconomic policy themes and 
finally microeconomic policy elements.  
 
The United Nations has been a forum where less developed countries have argued for 
a right to development. Sengupta (2002) describes the right to development as relating 
to a manner of implementation of development policies that is participatory, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and accountable with a fair and equitable distribution of 
benefits (p 873). Furthermore, it is the right to a process that expands the capabilities 
or freedom of individuals to improve their well-being and to realise what they value (p 
868). Examining the right to development brings to light process and culturally based 
issues as an inherent part of policy discussion.  
 
Perceptions of economic disparity by prosperous countries are framed in terms of the 
dominant paradigm. For example aid usually involves policy prescriptions based upon 
assumptions regarding efficient markets, macroeconomic stability and supportive 
institutions (Roberts 2004). These prescriptions are based on the notion that growth 
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requires opportunity and acts of entrepreneurship by numerous actors working in the 
framework of market economies, which are facilitated by institutions that create and 
sustain business confidence and property rights. 
  
Recent analysis of development policy concludes that expenditure has to be efficient, 
appropriately focused, and sensitive to local conditions and the constraints on intended 
beneficiaries (Roberts 2004). This appears rational as focusing on the relaxation of the 
binding constraint is expected to yield the largest results. The difficulty may be that the 
binding constraint in particular situations may involve culturally based factors, resulting 
in continued perpetration of discrimination. 
 
Examination of how growth occurred within developed countries is used to formulate 
theory. The generally accepted neo classical description is that fostering 
entrepreneurial activity, expanding capacity, employing new technology, producing new 
products, searching for new markets, etc. has resulted in growth, and therefore should 
in other contexts. As entrepreneurs become energised, capital accumulation and 
technological change generate self propelling cycles of development (Rodrik 2004). To 
replicate such results the problem becomes one of how to crowd in investment and 
entrepreneurship with positive inducements (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco 2004). 
 
The micro-economic level approach focuses on the industrialised concepts of clusters 
and externalities to facilitate economic development. Agglomeration of economic 
activity is taken to reflect circular reinforcement based upon initial demand. 
“Whatever the reason for the initial location of a cluster, once a pattern of 
specialisation is established, increasing returns set in and the pattern of 
specialisation becomes ‘locked in’ by cumulative gains from trade.”  
(Helmsing 2001, p 279) 
Externalities of the industrial atmosphere also include the network of conventions, 
rules, common understandings in a cultural and socio-economic environment (Lawson 
1999, p 159). The Aboriginal traditional culture does not share these common 
understandings which may impede development. Dasgupta (2002) acknowledged that 
social networks can block the growth of markets. In this social interaction, relationships 
are of central importance (Lawson 1999, p 157). Therefore, a different set of economic 
policies may be required for remote area economic development where these 
conditions are prevalent. 
 
Norms are likely to be important at the microeconomic level of Aboriginal economic 
development policy. North (1989) describes how norms at the microeconomic level, the 
structure of rules and enforcement are transaction costs. Similarly Hobbs (1997) 
defines transaction costs as including negotiation and monitoring processes. Instead of 
reinforcing economic actions, Kherallah and Kirsten (2001) describe how the 
institutions, the formal rules of behaviour that are taken for granted in developed 
economies and that facilitate market exchange are absent in low income countries.  
 
Economic policy options based on individual wealth maximising behaviour and rational 
self interested actions may serve to explain economic growth in the dominant culture of 
developed countries but be less useful in other contexts. The way in which culture may 
influence policy is explored and then a potential policy application is examined. 
 
 
Culture and Form of Organisation 
 
 
The operations of capitalist enterprises establish labour contracts founded on notions 
of individual self interest that may conflict with cultural community responsibilities and 
expression of identity. Dean (2003) presents a framework which identifies social and 
cultural aspects. We identify how different business models may fit within these 
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frameworks contrasting Western individualism and traditional Indigenous Australian 
collectivism. We suggest a cooperative may traverse the main divide between the two 
cultural systems and their respective dynamics.  
 
Dean constructs a heuristic model (figure 1) based on two axes. The first dimension is 
between the universal and local. The universal is aligned to the social structure, ethical 
values and administrative systems through which social, economic and political 
resources are coordinated. The local represents individual agency, moral norms and 
customary practices. Universal is characterised by transparent ethics and 
administrative systems for governance. The local is characterised by the tendency 
towards individual control along tribal or religious boundaries, such as warlordism and 
dictatorships. The “Universal-Local” axis approximates the divide between the two 
differing prevalent cultural marketing systems of western individual-ownership and 
collective-tribal systems.  
 
The horizontal contractarian - solidaristic axis displays the strength that individual 
autonomy has and its dominance in market freedoms. The further to the left on the axis 
the greater the contractual obligation holds priority, the more individualistic the social 
order. Explicit trade-offs between competitive and self-interested individuals require 
contracts or covenants. Individual ownership rights dominate the legal environment. 
The further to the right individualistic motivations are subservient to social cohesion 
and societal needs. The collectivist society gives priority to sustaining the cooperative 
and political power is pooled or shared within the social group. 
 
Universal 
Concerned with: 
social structure 
ethical values 
technical/administrative systems 
Local 
Concerned with: 
individual agency 
moral norms 
customary practices 
Contractarian 
The sovereignty of the 
bargaining/competitive  
 subject is traded to achieve 
a minimum of social order 
Solidaristic 
The sovereignty of the 
attached/co-operative 
subject is pooled to 
achieve the maximum 
social cohesion 
 
Source: Hartley Dean, 2003 Discursive Repertoires and the Negotiation of Well-being.  
Pp 4  
Figure 1: Analytical dimensions 
 
The usual form of organisation in capitalist economies, the publicly owned corporation 
would likely be placed in the Universal / Contractarian quadrant. Activities in a 
customary or traditional context would likely be in the Local/ Solidaristic quadrant. To 
mitigate against potential conflicts arising from the opposite nature, intermediation 
through the Universal / Solidaristic quadrant might be used. A cooperative enterprise 
might provide a form of organisation for this purpose. 
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Cooperative 
he cooperative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet 
eir common economic, social or cultural needs through a jointly owned and 
 
 
T
th
democratically controlled enterprise (Staatz 1984). There are a plethora of different 
cooperative models and structures in operation highlighted by Chaddad and Cook 
(2002). Chaddad and Cook (2002) used an ownership rights perspective (figure 2) to 
synthesise work by Grossman and Hart (1986), Schrader (1989), Collins (1991), 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Cook (1995) and Plunkett and Kingwell (2001). As 
ownership rights move from traditional structures towards investor-oriented firms the 
more contractarian they become.  
 
 
Figure 2: Alternative co-operative models 
 
Rokholt (2000) argu yalty dynamic. The 
roup/community dynamic reduces risk by collective sharing to overcome the adverse 
 
dividual ownership rights in contrast to cooperation within the community. A collective 
es the strength of cooperatives is in the lo
g
economic conditions that inhibit individual actions. This finds support among social 
science researchers (Dodgson, 1993; Kotter, 1996) and the cooperative organising 
field (Zusman, 1993; Torgerson, 1997; Nes, 1998, Rokholt, 1992, 1999). Traditionally 
based loyalty is a product of social process that is culturally and socially supported and 
enforced. The organisation is seen as part of the implementation of group strategy 
based on historical (cultural) experiences and a continuous evaluation of the situation.  
 
The cooperative then allows for engagement with the economically dominant sphere of
in
culture traditional business can meet the needs of its traditional collective base as well 
as operate and compete in a western socio-economic dominant market.  
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Prospective policy 
he importance of norms and interactions indicates that the form of organisation might 
e considered with regards to such transaction costs. Where transaction costs are 
 it needs to 
nsure that the issues that have plagued Indigenous businesses are addressed, the 
 and traditional characteristics 
f Australian Indigenous people need to be not only taken into account but absorbed 
onclusion 
olicy for Indigenous economic development with specific attention to the role of 
ulture is examined. This paper identified some of the theoretical foundation issues in 
 
 
T
b
important efficient policy options should consider ownership structures and property 
relations. Distinctive cultural values and systems lead to potential disutility to participate 
in entrepreneurial activities as assumptions of self-oriented motivation reflect conflicting 
priority of individual values over cultural identity and relationship to family. 
 
Altman (2002) recognized that if an innovative approach is to succeed
e
main being governance problems, lack of main-market stream financial institutional 
support and experienced and skilled mentors and facilitators from the dominant market 
businesses. Altman also suggests there is a need at the national level for greater 
collaboration between existing Indigenous institutions, building alliances with 
mainstream businesses especially financial institutions.  
 
Altman (2002) and Martin (2003) recognize that cultural
o
and blended into any business model approach to Indigenous economic development. 
Martin et al. (2002) discuss the need for a model that blends the two or allows an 
integrated mix to accommodate the traditional collective/ community user member 
dynamic with the investor oriented dynamic of the dominant market society. Martin 
(2003) stipulates that policy in respect to development must acquire an attitude shift 
towards seeing Indigenous culture as creating a strategic differentiation from social-
dominant economic market competitors and not as a disadvantage. Martin (2003) also 
sees a necessity to develop models purely on commercial endeavors that meet the 
western market ideology of individual ownership rights and agency theories. Martin 
(2003) suggests that the political and social norms must be left to the informal and can 
not be codified within the formal workings. We suggest that such problems are 
fundamentally in opposition to the theoretical bases of free market policies. Explicit 
consideration can and should be given to the culturally evolving landscape in 
Indigenous communities. 
 
 
C
 
 
P
c
policy design. Economic development policy for remote and very remote Indigenous 
communities must be sensitive to cultural differences.  Explicitly accounting for cultural 
influences is the start of realising a right to development for Indigenous Australians. In 
particular, how individual identity in community and connection to place may undermine 
the motivational assumptions of free market solutions and affect Indigenous enterprise 
performance. Cooperatives can be designed to accommodate specific concerns such 
as property ownership, title and individual self interest. 
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